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I have read your piece. When you strike at a king, you must
kill him.
Ralph Waldo Emerson'
When Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, boy reporters at
the Washington Post, sat down at their typewriter-it was an IBM
Selectric-their minds were racing in anticipation of their new
achievement. They had brought down a President.2 Congress had
fallen by itself. There remained only the Supreme Court to be
brought to its knees and they had the ammunition to do it. They
had "interviews with more than two hundred people, including several Justices, more than 170 former law clerks, and several dozen
former employees of the Court."' 3 What is more, each of their informants had total recall. "The sources who helped us were persons of
remarkable intelligence. They had unusually precise recall about
the handling of cases that came before the Supreme Court, particularly the important ones." ' Even better, they had documents purloined from the files of the Justices.
They would show what mortals these godlike Justices are and
"what fools these mortals be." 5 They would put words into the
mouths of the Justices and ideas into their minds.
This time, moreover, there would be none to naysay them. The
White House had vigorously denied the press charges about its Watt William R. Kennan, Jr. Distinguished Service Professor in The College, Professor in
The Law School, The University of Chicago.
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ergate behavior, whether the allegations were true or false. But the
Justices wouldn't take up the gauntlet: they were under a vow of
silence and it would be infra dig for them to speak anyway. And
since none of the informers was to be identified, they, like the earlier
creation, "Deep Throat," could not challenge the authors' allegations. Their technique was once condemned when it was used by
Senator Joseph McCarthy, but that was different. He was a Senator; they were "the Press." Besides, it is almost impossible, under
the Supreme Court's own law, to libel a public figure and certainly
the Justices are public figures.
And so came to pass the best seller that would bring kudos as
well as cash to these daring authors. "Well roar'd, Lion."'
No. I have no more to prove the truth of these statements about
what went on in the minds of the authors of this volume than they
have to prove the truth of their statements about what went oi in
the minds of the Justices. When challenged for proofs, however, I
can cite with equal justification "reliable sources on background."
The authors' primary purpose in writing this volume was allegedly to strip-away the veil of secrecy from the Court's deliberations.
The suggestion is that there is something sinister in its private processes for decisionmaking. At the very outset the book acknowledges
that these processes are of ancient vintage:
For. . .nearly two hundred years, the Court has made its
decisions in absolute secrecy, handing down its judgments in
formal written opinions. Only these opinions, final and unreviewable, are published. No American institution has so completely controlled the way it is reviewed by the public. The
Court's deliberative process-its internal debates, the tentative positions taken by the Justices, the preliminary votes, the
various drafts of written opinions, the negotiations, confrontations, and compromises-is hidden from public view.'
Indeed, this is true. The Court behaves much like the editorial
board of a newspaper, depriving the public of access to deliberations
that could never take place if the public were admitted to them.
It is not clear just how the authors would propose to abolish this
secrecy. Would they make the conference room and the Justices'
chambers subject to television coverage as the Justices go about
their work? Would they make the drafts and memoranda subject to
Id. at V, 1, 257.
WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG at 1.
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disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act?8 Would they have
the Justices hold press conferences? Would they use the favorite
device of the "investigative reporter," the leak? The last is the
reliance of this book, but only long after the events occurred. The
authors have eschewed revealing "inside" information about the
last few Terms lest it "interfere with the ongoing work of the
Court." 9 This tacit admission that publicity about the relations
among the Justices could interfere with their proper functions does
not comport either with the authors' general thesis or with their
production of "evidence."
There is also a mysterious hint about the authors' own bravery
in doing what they did here. In praising Benjamin Bradlee, the
executive editor of the Washington Post, and their publisher,
Richard Snyder, Woodward and Armstrong say: "No other newspaper editor or book publisher would have been willing to assume the
risks inherent in a detailed examination of an independent branch
of government whose authority, traditions and protocols have put
it beyond the reach of journalism."' 0 What risks? They do not say;
they say only that the risks are "inherent." Men of La Mancha in
their own eyes. The Sancho Panzas who spend much of their time
engaged "in detailed examination of [this] independent branch of
government" recognize windmills for what they are.
Although there are repeated intimations in the book that the
secrecy of the conference room and the Justices' chambers is a consequence of Warren E. Burger's tenure as chief justice, such secrecy
long antedates the period of the Burger Court. And the defense of
the processes are to be found in the writing of the patron saint of
the authors and their informers, Chief Justice Earl Warren, who also
explains a tradition at which the authors take umbrage, that the
Chief Justice votes last:
On Saturday morning, we held a conference on the cases heard
during the week. The procedure was very simple. In each case,
the Chief Justice would, in a few sentences, state how the case
appeared to him, and how he was inclined to decide it. Then,
beginning with Justice Black, the senior Justice, each would
speak his mind in a similar manner. He might only say, "I look
at it the same way the Chief does and come to the same conclusion," or he might say, "I view the case differently. It seems to
9 5 U.S.C.

§ 552 (1976).
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me this is the real issue, etc.," defining it. Or, "I believe it is
controlled by the case of So-and-So v. So-and-So (citing precedent), and that brings me out the other way." Then we proceeded down the line until everyone had spoken briefly in this
formal manner. During all of this, nobody was interrupted, and
there was no debate. If we were all of one mind and no one
desired to say anything mote, the case was ready for assignment for the writing of the opinion. The Chief Justice always
assigned the opinion to be written if he were with the majority.
If he were not, the senior Justice who was with the majority
made the assignment. If, after the first canvassing of the Court,
as I have described it, there was a difference of opinion, the
case was open for debate. We did not observe Robert's Rules
of Order or any other definite procedure. It was a selfdisciplined affair, each Justice deferring to the speaker until he
was finished. The discussion proceeded in an orderly manner
until all had spoken much as they desired. If they were ready
to vote, we did so at that time. In voting, we reversed the
process and first called on the junior member, going up the
ladder with the Chief Justice voting last. I have tried diligently
to learn when and why this procedure was first adopted, but
without success. It is one of those things that grew up in the
dim past and has been carried on without question ...
During these conferences, no one was in the room except
the Justices-not a secretary, a law clerk, or even a messenger.
If it were necessary for anyone to contact us, it was done by
written message and a knock on the door. When there was a
knock, the junior member of the Court answered it unless he
was speaking at the time, in which case some other Justice
would respond. We had a telephone in the room, but I have no
recollection of its ever having been used during a conference
1
while I was on the Court.
Other histories of the Court indicate that the conference has not
always been so orderly and polite as Chief Justice Warren described
" E. WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 282-83 (1977). A footnote here by the
editor of the Warren autobiography is relevant to The Brethren. "Reliable sources have it
that on at least one occasion the traditional knock on the door and delivery of the message
were solemnly observed to carry World Series scores to the Chief Justice." Id. at 283 n.t.
Woodward and Armstrong sneeringly report similar interests on the part of some Justices in
securing information about current sports events. E.g., WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG at 302 n.*.
Is there any deep insight to be derived from the fact that at least the three most recent Chief
Justices have suffered the affliction of being avid sports fans? It was even rumored that Chief
Justice Vinson contemplated resigning his post to become Commissioner of Baseball.
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it. There is an abundance of documentary evidence to this effect in
Alpheus T. Mason's biography of Chief Justice Stone.1 2 For example, Stone is recorded as writing: "I have had much difficulty in
herding my collection of fleas . . . and they have been so busy
disagreeing with each other that I have found it necessary to take
more opinions than I really should."' 3 In light of their own experiences, members of the academy who attend faculty meetings would
not expect anything different.
Indeed, maintaining the Justices' freedom to wrangle with each
other over matters for which easy unanimous answers should not
usually be expected is the real and adequate justification for the
privacy of the conference room and the chambers. The charge of
inappropriate secrecy, not new to this book, nettled Chief Justice
Warren:
[Iln the news media the Court is often portrayed as a mysterious body operating behind a veil of secrecy, and the general
public is led to believe that its "mystique" is beyond the comprehension of normal individuals. This is far from the truth,
and after sixteen years on the Court and several in retirement,
I am prepared to say that its processes are more available to
the public than those of the other branches of government-the
Congress and the presidency.
The reason its activities are not better known is because
the media does not consider the Court's work newsworthy until
it makes a decision which stirs emotion on the part of great
numbers of people on the losing side. Then the media gives a
superficial judgment which is often wide of the mark, and
leaves the matter to the public in that unsatisfactory condition.
This is largely because news gatherers are not deeply concerned
with the proceedings before the Court until decision day; their
homework is thus generally inadequate ...
• . .All these briefs are public documents open to inspection. . . .All arguments to the Court are open to the public,
and much of the time the courtroom is crowded with lawyers,
representatives of the news media, and members of the general
public. With the argument concluded, the case is submitted to
the Court for decision.
From this point until the decision of the Court is announced to the public, the decision-making process is, of ne12
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cessity, confidential. . . . Throughout the decision-making
process, members of the Court are left to their own consciences
in the quiet of their chambers to reflect on the facts and the
applicable law, except for any discussions they might have with
their colleagues on the merits of their cases.14
Remember, these are not the words of the great enemy of the
press, the incumbent Chief Justice, but those of him of blessed
memory-the great friend of the media, at least in retrospect15-Earl Warren.
The authors also, on several occasions, deride the attempts of
the Court to enjoin the law clerks to silence. The clerks, it is suggested, objected to the initiating lectures telling them that what
they learned and what they heard in the course of their duties was
to be kept confidential. If the law clerks' rage was due'to the implicit
suggestion that absent such admonitions they would not know
enough to keep quiet, the present volume proves the desirability and
perhaps the necessity, if not the efficacy, of such warnings. Better
men than these clerks have received such advice over the years, and
better men than they have followed it, with no showing of detriment
either to the Court or the country.
The fact of the matter is that the breaches of confidentiality
made available by this book have revealed not a bit of wrongdoing
by the Justices. Indeed, the only revelation that comes close to the
line has been proved false. The authors adduce argument that Justice Brennan traded his vote in a criminal case as an inducement
to attract Justice Blackmun to the Brennan camp in future abortion
and obscenity cases. 6 The charge against Brennan has since been
definitively disproved.17 But the authors have not recanted. Instead,
they have fallen back on "Deep Throat": "we know that from other
sources."' 8 Unidentified sources, of course. As Anthony Lewis has
said about this treatment of Moore v. Illinois,9 in language kinder
than the authors deserve:
11E.

WARREN, supra note 11, at 335, 336-37; cf. id. at 342 ("the-judicial process as it

functions in the Supreme Court is more open than that of either the legislative or executive
branches of the government").
11See Dennis, Overcoming Occupational Heredity at the Supreme Court, 66 A.B.A.J.
41, 45 (1980) ("Burger is in fact much more forthcoming with the public and the press than
was Warren, but the public has forgotten this and focuses on the man of the moment.").
WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG at 224-25.
,7 See Lewis, Supreme Court Confidential,N.Y. REv. OF BOOKS, Feb. 17, 1980, at 3.
Id.
" 408 U.S. 786 (1972).
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The Brethren. .. makes a serious charge without serious evidence-almost offhandedly, in two pages. It gets facts wrong.
It gives the impression of relying on a conversation between
Brennan and a law clerk that the law clerks of that term say
never took place. If the passage was not meant to rely on such
a conversation with a clerk, then it grossly misleads the reader.
In sum, the treatment of Moore v. Illinois leaves doubts not
only about the authors' understanding but about their scrupulousness.20
Virginia Woolf once wrote: "I think politicians and journalists
must be the lowest of Gods creatures, creeping perpetually in the
mud, and biting with one end and stinging with the other."' 21 The
Brethren is only further evidence of the validity of this dictum. The
publication of The Brethren is a media event, that is, an occasion
without any intrinsic importance that is foisted off on a gullible
public through ballyhoo as though there were something there. It is
a tour-de-force effected solely through "hype." P.T. Barnum would
have loved it.
The Brethren is a journalist's weapon that was quite clearly
aimed at the b~te-noir of the American press, the incumbent Chief
Justice of the United States. Chief Justice Burger was an easy target
for the gossip mongering of which this book largely consists, for
surely at times he is vain, overbearing, crotchety, self-righteous, and
thin-skinned, just like his predecessor. Nor did the authors miss
their target. But they were firing a shotgun, not a rifle, and the
buckshot they scattered tore the skin of every other Justice as much
as it did that of the Chief. Indeed, the three Justices that the authors and their spies seemed to regard as the most admirable were
among those most severely wounded: Justices Douglas, Brennan,
and Marshall. The first of these largely because of the authors'
disgustingly graphic depiction of a once-great jurist-perhaps the
last of the Court's giants-in the final days of his tenure when he
had control over neither his mind nor his body. And Brennan appears as a whimpering, petty, hate-filled, disappointed Don Quixote, frustrated by the failure of the new Chief to follow where his
predecessor had led. Marshall is made to look like a clown, in the
words of Woodward and Armstrong, like an "Amos and Andy" character, which is surely unfair.
But then no man is a hero to his lackeys. The stories told in The
2
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Brethren are built on the tale bearings of the Justices' loyal ex-staff
members, law clerks apparently disappointed by their failure to
control the decisions of the Court. Only Justice Stevens escapes
with his skin intact, and that is probably because the scope of this
volume covers only the first six months of his tenure. Or perhaps it
was because Stevens, unlike his colleagues, employs only two clerks
at a time, thus maintaining a closeness and confidentiality that is
dissipated by the large numbers in other chambers.
Doubts must exist as to the truthfulness of the tattling. The
sources of the stories are unidentified, allegedly because the tattlers
were unwilling to be known for their breaches of confidence. The
book consists largely of hearsay, or hearsay once-, twice-, or thriceremoved. That some of it is greatly embellished by the authors'
imaginations seems obvious. That some of it is pure fiction is revealed by the numerous quotations of thoughts that could be known
only to the minds they occupied. William Woolfolk's novel, Opinion
of the Court,2admittedly fiction, anticipated most of the contents
of The Brethren, except that the particular cases and Justices that
he fictionalizes were of an earlier vintage. (The few statements of
events about which I have knowledge are plainly erroneous. These
disparities from truth are not important in themselves, but, like the
story of Moore v. Illinois," sow seeds of doubt about all the other
allegedly factual statements unproved by objective data.)
I do not mean to deny the validity of the primary effect of the
book, a demonstration that the Emperor is in fact naked. That the
Justices have-and have expressed-distaste for one another, that
they bicker and engage in petty annoyances, that each regards himself as the keeper of the Holy Grail, that some lack the learning or
intelligence necessary to an adequate performance of their functions, that irrationality often replaces rationality as the measure of
judgment, that politics in its lowest form plays a role in adjudication, all of these things cannot be gainsaid.
The fact is, however, that the Emperor has been naked almost
since he came to power. Similar contemporary disclosures could
have been made-had there been similar contemporary breaches of
confidence-about the Justices of the Warren Court, the Vinson
Court, the Stone Court, the Hughes Court, the Taft Court, and so
on back to the time when the Great Chief Justice started the Court
on its road to becoming a council of revision and a continuing constitutional convention.
W.
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Obviously, the Court as a public institution of no small power
is a very proper object of informed criticism. Judge Learned Hand
once wrote that
while it is proper that people should find fault when their
judges fail, it is only reasonable that they should recognize the
difficulties. Perhaps it is also fair to ask that before the judges
are blamed they should be given credit of having tried to do
their best. Let them be severely brought to book, when they go
wrong, but by those who will take the trouble to understand. 4
Nothing in The Brethren comes close to the kind of reasoned criticism of the Court's work that was endorsed by Judge Hand. The
Justices are certainly not credited with "having tried to do their
best." Surely there is no evidence of an attempt or a capacity "to
understand them." Their treatment of the presidential-tapes case,
United States v. Nixon,2 5 for example, seems to rest on an assumption that there really were not two sides to the issues, that Justices
who were not inclined to grant review before judgment in the court
of appeals, or who entertained a notion that these were political,
nonjudicial questions, or who were not sure before considering
the arguments that the judgment must go against Nixon, were
scoundrels supporting an evil President.
What we have in The Brethren is essentially a collection of
personal crotchets, conceits, quirks, whimsies, foibles, eccentricities, and caprices of nine human beings engaged in a task worthy
of Plato's Guardians. This book is not criticism, it is only muckraking. It will afford titillation to the naive, and rouse the prurient
interest of the sophisticated, political voyeur. Perhaps it is in the
best tradition of the journalistic profession, but if so it is the tradition of Walter Winchell rather than Walter Lippmann. In terms of
importance and loflgevity, its most likely precedent is a book by one
of the authors' "sponsors," 26 Benjamin Bradlee's Conversationswith
Kennedy.Y The Brethren likely will bring no shame to any except
those who provided the offal that was packaged in this volume.
One can readily guess as to the book's lasting consequences.
Temporarily, it may cause the Justices to deny private confidences
to their law clerks or even to their colleagues. It may, but is not
likely to, cause a lowering of popular confidence in the Court which,
2
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while it does not stand high in the people's estimation, stands higher
than either of the other two branches of the national government-or the press.2 Since the power of the Court depends entirely
on public respect for its judgments, the Court could come to feel
somewhat constrained in rewriting the Constitution, congressional
statutes, and executive orders. That would be a good, but not a
likely, consequence so long as the Justices look upon this book as
the shoddy thing that it is.
The only sure consequence of The Brethren is that it will 'enhance the purses of its authors and publishers, thus giving the lie
to Iago's proposition that "he that filches from me my good name
robs me of that which not enriches him. 2' 9 H.L. Mencken records
an old German proverb: "Little people like to talk about what the
great are doing. '3° And the press has taken the opportunity to cash
in on the mass interest in gossip. The Brethren is only an example
of the general trend of the press to emphasize its function of reporting minutiae-especially embarrassing minutiae-about the high
and the mighty in politics, entertainment, and sports. Even the
once dignified New York Times now has its gossip columns. It also
publishes the magazine Us, which, with Time-Life's People,
affords slick mass-circulation weekly magazines providing nothing
but such gossip. Together with its ordinary television fare, with its
semipornographic magazines exploiting the interest in male and
female nudity and sexuality, and its comic strips, the press, under
the protection of the first amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court, gives the public what it wants, if at a nice profit. In
light of its product, it is difficult to understand its self-righteous
attitudes. The Brethren fits the pattern of the newsman's notion of
deep research about the nation's officials and their actions. The
Court is no more demeaned-although the Justices may be more
resentful; they do tend to be thin-skinned-than are the legislative
and executive branches of officialdom. (On rare occasions, even this
self-appointed overseer of American life and government, the
press, is itself the subject of study and criticism, but almost never
31
in the media itself).
It must be conceded, however, that the Court's claim to im21 See Carmody, JournalistsTold 4 out of 10 in Poll FavorStrongerLimitations on the
Press, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1980, § A, at 10, col. 5.
2' W. SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO, Ill, 3, 163. Cf. id. at II, 3, 254 ("Reputation, reputation,
reputation! 0! 1 have lost my reputation. I have lost the immortal part of myself, and what
remains is bestial. My reputation, Iago, my reputation! ").
3oH. MENCKEN, A Naw DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 479 (1962).
31 See, e.g., D. HALBERSTAM, THE POWERS THAT BE (1979).

19791

Review

munity from press invasion of its deliberative processes is now on
more tenuous ground than ever. The Court's functions have become
so politicized that whatever immunity once attached to judicial
decisionmaking no longer affords firm justification. When I suggest
that the Court has become politicized, I do not mean, of course, that
the Justices have allowed party loyalties or affiliations to control
their judgments, although the book's treatment of the Nixon appointees-in keeping with the attitude of much of the press-would
suggest such political machinations. As with the so-called Roosevelt
Court, however, the expectations that the appointees of a single
President would act as a bloc in the effectuation of the President's
programs have proved false. By politicization I mean only that the
Court's function is no longer primarily the judicial one of resolving
legal controversies between contesting parties, but the legislative
one of making general governmental policies for the nation, and the
executive one of enforcing the policies that it so declares. The meaning of the constitutional or statutory language or of judicial precedents no longer provides the principal guides to decision. Rather,
each decision seems to represent a personal choice by the Justices
preferring what they think is good over what they think is less
good, or less bad over bad. And there is much in The Brethrenthat
underlines what we already knew. The secrecy of the conference
room and the chambers, therefore, may properly be proved to be a
means of concealment of the real reasons for decisions. The reasons
that are purportedly given in the opinions, the book suggests, are
neither the real reasons nor even the Justices' reasons but those
conjured up by the Court's staff to make its conclusions palatable.
But The Brethren falls woefully short of proof on this score.
At about the time The Brethren was being serialized in the
newspapers and magazines, Judge Irving Kaufman of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit delivered a
speech-totally unrelated to the book-in which he beseeched the
country to provide the judiciary with a protector against attack. He
explained the need thus: "As courts have been compelled to assume
certain legislative and executive functions, they have come under
attack from many quarters."3 Of course, the courts have not "been
compelled to assume certain legislative and executive functions."
They have usurped these functions. It may well be, therefore, that
a governmental body acting in the legislative and executive mode
should be subject to the same oversight, criticism, and review af-

2
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forded the other branches of government, and treated in the press
with the same skepticism if not cynicism that critics afford these
other branches. Moreover, the Justices themselves are contributing
to the erosion of their privacy and the decline of the concept of the
opinion as the sole explanation of their judgment by making
speeches purporting to explain their judgments in terms different
from those in their opinions.
There is another question suggested by the politicization of the
Court. If in fact the Court is making public policy rather than
merely arbitrating disputes, the question is whether the machinery
available to it for its promulgation of such public policy is adequate.
The briefs of counsel, even when multiplied by lobbying groups who
are self-termed "friends of the Court," cannot supply the necessary
data on which judgment should rest. Moreover, most briefs are still
couched in constitutional and statutory language and Supreme
Court precedents. They are usually only collaterally and euphemistically directed to the social and political issues that the Court will
address. And certainly, the "bright and beautiful" young people
who serve as law clerks do not fill the gap. (The Brethren suggests
that the clerks have the necessary self-assurance for the job; it also
suggests more clearly that they don't have the talent, experience,
or wisdom for it.) The question that is not answered, then, is
whether the venerated adversary system ought to be modified even
more than it has been if the Court is to perform its legislative role
adequately.
The problem is not newly arisen. Almost forty years ago, Justice
Robert H. Jackson noted:
Judicial justice is well adapted to ensure that established
legislative rules are fairly and equitably applied to individual
cases. But it is inherently ill suited, and never can be suited,
to devising or enacting rules of general social policy. Litigation
procedures are clumsy and narrow at best; technical and tricky
at their worst.
Custom decrees that the Supreme Court shall be composed only of lawyers, though the Constitution does not say so.
Those lawyers on the bench will hear only from lawyers at the
bar. If the views of the scientist, the laborer, the business man,
the social worker, the economist, the legislator, or the government executive reach the Court, it is only through the lawyer,
in spite of the fact that the effect of the decision may be far
greater in other fields than in jurisprudence. Thus government
by lawsuit leads to a final decision guided by the learning and
limited by the understanding of a single profession-the law.
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It is no condemnation of that profession to doubt its capacity to furnish single-handed the rounded and comprehensive
wisdom to govern all society. No more, indeed not nearly so
much, would I entrust only doctors, or economists, or engineers, or educators, or theologians, to make a final review of our
democratically adopted legislation. But we must not blink the
fact that legal philosophy is but one branch of learning with
peculiarities of its own and that judicial review of the reasonableness of legislation means the testing of the whole social
process by the single standard-of men of the law.33
Another question implicitly rather than explicitly raised by The
Brethren concerns the proper role of the law clerks. There is no
doubt that the offices of most of the Justices have become bureaucratized with ever growing numbers of clerks. In part, the result
seems to have been that each office is now a unit in itself, a bureau
within a department. One consequence is a necessarily reduced collegiality among the Justices, as each of them concentrates on the
management of his own chambers, with the suggestion that the
conference room becomes a cockpit rather than a forum for framing
opinions about which the Justices should have already exchanged
views. The Brethren treats discussions among some of the Justices,
which are really a necessary part of their function, as conspiratorial
acts, and usually characterizes them as attacks on the Chief Justice.
But according to Woodward and Armstrong, it is the law clerks who
undertake missions from "their" chambers to those of the other
Justices; it is the law clerks who caucus. The law clerks-at least
those whose interviews are reported here-have clearly overstated
their importance, with their revelations, however true, of lecturing
Justices on what the proper role of a Justice is, of "delivering" their
Justice's votes, of making deals as to the contents of opinions, of
refusing to draft arguments with which they disagree, or refusing to
send out to the other members of the Court a Justice's memorandum that the clerk disliked. Much of this is Walter Mitty daydreaming. The fact remains, however, that too much of the business
of the Court is not conducted by the Justices but rather by their law
clerks.
The cause is plain: there is too much work for the Justices to
do. The consequence is that a single law clerk writes the memorandum on which five Justices must rely in determining whether to
grant review. More importantly, more and more of the opinions are
33 R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SuPREMACY

288, 291-92 (1941).
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written by the law clerks rather than their Justices. Probably, there
should be no objection to this if the opinions are simply rationalizations of conclusions rather than explanations of the real reasons for
them. The law clerks may be serving the function of a legislative
reference bureau in choosing the words to give meaning to the legislature's will, or in manufacturing the equivalent of legislative history in an effort to sneak in a different meaning for statutes from
that which secured the approval of the lawmakers.
And that again raises the question whether the Justices are
judges or legislators. Certainly one of the misfortunes of the bureaucratization of the Justices' chambers is that the resulting opinions
are frequently jejune and their extraordinary length-the current
batches of opinions fill more and more pages, making Justice Frankfurter's frequent overlong opinions seem terse by comparison-confuses rather than elucidates the problems.
Enough seriousness. The Brethren is meant for cakes and ale.
But its readers outside the bar, the public to whom the book is
addressed, will find most of it dull and uninformative. While many
will buy it, it is safe to say that only a very small number will try
or be able to read it through. Except for the fact that the expletives
are not deleted, it is not nearly so entertaining or informative as
were the unvarnished presidential tapes. Perhaps the authors would
have done better by their audience had they simply taped their
interviews and then published them, especially if they were to name
those whose words we are asked to accept at face value. How different would their stories be if they were deprived of the confidentiality
they refused to give to the Court?

